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Abstract
In this paper, I estimate the effect of increasing labor mobility on personal income
tax schedules. I combine rich data on effective personal income tax levels in a panel of
OECD countries for the period 1986-2005 with a new Index of Potential Labor Mobility.
This index allows to tackle issues of reverse causality and potentially confounding effects
from strategic competition. Estimates show that increasing labor mobility accounts for a
considerable part of lower tax burdens. Furthermore, the reduction is found to be constant
across brackets of taxable income.
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1 Introduction
In OECD countries, personal income taxation accounts for roughly 35-40 per cent of govern-
ment revenues, whereas taxes on capital income collect only about 10-15 per cent of total
revenues.1 Despite the apparent importance of personal income taxation, the literature on
tax competition has so far mostly focussed on competition in capital taxation. This focus has
been supported by the widespread notion that labor was virtually immobile between countries
(Wilson 1999). However, a rapidly growing literature on international migration has shown
that labor, and in particular high-skilled labor, is far from being immobile: Defoort (2006)
estimates that on average between five per cent (below college education) and ten per cent (at
least college education) of world population have emigrated to one of the six main receiving
countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the US) since the mid 70s. Fur-
thermore, recent theoretical research by Simula and Trannoy (2010) shows that even modest
increases in the international mobility of high-skilled can have considerable effects on the op-
timal personal income tax schedule. The increasing number of preferential tax treatments for
foreign high-skilled (e.g. in Denmark or Singapore), which are explicitly designed to increase
the international mobility of high-skilled labor, highlight that tax policy makers are aware of
labor mobility and its effects on domestic tax bases. Thus, it is worthwhile to quantitatively
assess the effect of increasing labor mobility on domestic personal income taxation.
This paper provides estimates of the effect of (an) increasing (threat of) emigration on the
level and the shape of personal income tax schedules in 26 OECD countries between 1986 and
2005. Estimating these effects, the paper makes two main contributions:
First, I account for heterogenous effects of mobility on taxes paid by high and low-income
earners. Since international mobility is quite heterogenous across skill and thus income groups,
the effect of increased labor mobility may not only affect the level but also the shape of the tax
schedule. More precisely, a flattening of the schedule is to be expected if skilled labor is most
mobile, potentially involving higher tax levels at the bottom of the income distribution. I can
capture this effect by using rich data on the shape of personal income tax systems which includes
information on average and marginal tax rates at various points of the income distribution. This
approach allows to account for heterogenous effects at different points of the tax schedule.
Second, I construct a new Index of Potential Labor Mobility, containing yearly information
on 26 OECD countries, 1986-2005. The index is based on country-pair specific information
and contains both push factors (i.e. factors influencing an individual’s decision to leave its
current country of residence) and pull factors (i.e. factors influencing an individual’s decision
to settle in a specific country). Compared to using observed labor flows, this index has several
advantages: The first advantage is the ability to cope with reverse causality. Taxation is known
to have an impact on individual migration decisions (Abramitzky 2009; Kleven et al. 2011).
This concern is of major relevance as the sign of the estimates changes with the direction of
causality: Higher taxation increases emigration, but more emigration lowers the optimal tax
1Excluding social security contributions. OECD averages 1986-2005 from OECD.stat Government Revenue
Statistics.
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level. Using the Index of Potential Labor Mobility helps to disentangle these two channels: In
addition to economic criteria, the index is based on indicators which are not under the control
of current tax policy, such as cultural and geographical proximity, family values, or the ability
to speak foreign languages. Therefore, reverse causality is hardly an issue when using this
index. Second, the index allows to account for the effects of strategic competition in personal
income taxation. As in the well-documented case of capital taxation, policy makers may react to
increasing potential mobility of workers by adjusting tax systems such that no labor flows occur.
Since the Index of Potential Labor Mobility represents the economic concept on which policy
makers base their decisions, it allows to address this channel as well. The third advantage of the
index is that it allows to link the empirical analysis closer to the theory. Existing theoretical
models of the effect of labor mobility on income taxation (e.g. Simula and Trannoy (2010))
represent changes in the mobility of labor by variations in the cost incurred when relocating.
My Index of Potential Labor Mobility is an indicator for the net costs associated with migration
and thus the empirical counterpart of the core parameter in these models.
The descriptives of the index show some interesting features: First, potential labor mobility
is quite low, with values averaging at about seven per cent of its theoretical maximal value.
This highlights the scope of the topic to gain in policy relevance. Second, potential mobility
has increased considerably over the last two decades, particularly after the fall of the iron cur-
tain. Third, cross-country differences are more pronounced than variation over time.2 Finally,
countries in Scandinavia and Southern Europe known for high levels of taxation show relatively
low levels of potential mobility, whereas low tax ”anglo-saxon” countries have relatively mobile
populations. Taken together, these stylized facts hint at a growing importance of labor mobility
and a connection with tax issues.
The results of the empirical tests are in line with the main hypothesis of this paper: In-
creasing potential labor mobility lowers the tax burden on labor income. However, there is no
robust evidence on heterogeneity across brackets of taxable income. The estimated effect is of
considerable size: The German workforce experienced the largest increase in potential labor
mobility during the period 1986 to 2005. This increase led to a reduction of the average tax
burden for incomes of about 100,000 Euros per year in 20053 by at least five percentage points,
depending on specification. For the US, increasing international labor mobility can explain
roughly a quarter of tax reductions in that period. The general patterns of the effects are
robust to the inclusion of a variety of economic and political controls, accounting for indirect
effects through the general budget or ”spill-overs” from capital taxation, and for an alternative
specification of the index. Furthermore, I show that the effect of the index on personal income
taxation cannot be replicated when using standard measures of economic integration. Measures
of actual emigration are prone to severe reverse causality.
This paper is structured in the following way: In the next section, I discuss mostly theoretical
literature on the relationship between economic integration and personal income taxation to
derive hypotheses on how integration can be expected to change the shape of personal income
2This is true even when abstracting from time-invariant components of the index.
3Four times average GDP per capita.
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tax schedules. Furthermore, I present arguments in favor of using measures of potential labor
mobility instead of actual factor flows. Afterwards, I present the data I use in the empirical
investigations. Most notably, I give a detailed overview of the construction on the index, its
components, and the rationale for including these components. The third section is concluded
by presenting descriptive statistics of the index. The fourth section presents and discusses the
results of regressing the tax indicators on my Index of Potential Labor Mobility in a variety
of specifications and robustness checks. In the fifth section, I re-estimate the regressions of
the fourth section using an alternative version of the index which uses weights estimated from
migration data. Finally, I conclude.
2 Theory
This section serves two main purposes: First , I argue why international economic integration,
and in particular labor mobility, is an empirically relevant determinant of the level and shape
of personal income tax schedules. Second, I discuss two measures of labor mobility, namely
observed mobility and potential mobility, and argue why potential labor mobility is a more
appropriate explanatory variable, both from an economic and a statistical point of view.
2.1 The Role of Economic Integration in Shaping Income Taxation
Economic integration can affect the system of personal income taxation through various chan-
nels. This study focusses on a particular direct channel, namely how increased mobility of
labor changes the optimal income tax schedule. However, there are also other channels present,
which I briefly discuss at the end of this section.
To provide a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, I briefly review the approach
taken by Simula and Trannoy (2010)4 who model the optimal tax schedule as outcome of a
mechanism design problem.5 In a nutshell, they extend the classical Mirrlees (1971)-framework
and allow for intensifying economic integration to shift individuals’ constraints for the partici-
pation in national tax systems inwards.
In their model, Simula and Trannoy (2010) study the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule
in a Mirrleesian economy which is populated by a continuum of individuals who can emigrate
to a foreign country with a given tax and redistribution policy. A key assumption of the
model is that the attractiveness of the outside option increases in individual productivity. The
government is assumed to maximize the net income of the worst-off individual, taking both
domestic labor supply and emigration incentives into account.
The emigration incentives are represented by a migration or participation constraint in an
otherwise standard mechanism design problem. This participation constraint for an individual
4Compare Simula and Trannoy (2011) for a somewhat more general version of Simula and Trannoy (2010).
5Compare Salanié (2011) for an extensive treatment of optimal taxation and Saez et al. (2012) for a survey
on the literature on the elasticity of taxable income.
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of productivity θ is given by
R(θ) = VH(θ) + c(θ)− VF (θ).
Individuals are assumed to emigrate if and only if R(θ) < 0, that is when the indirect utility
in foreign exceeds the sum of the home indirect utility and the cost of migration. All three
terms are assumed to increase in productivity θ. This participation constraint already provides
some structure for the empirical approach to labor migration: It has to consist of measures for
(i) economic opportunities at home (called push-factors by migration scholars), (ii) economic
opportunities abroad (pull-factors), and (iii) some cost of migration.
While solving the tax design problem described above, Simula and Trannoy (2010) make
several assumptions on the shape of the tax schedule, disutility of labor, and costs of migration.
However, independent of these assumptions, one important result prevails: Individuals pay
taxes that are the lower the more credibly the can threat to emigrate (c.p.).
Docquier and Marfouk (2005) document that observed international mobility of highly-
skilled individuals is considerably larger than the mobility of low-skilled workers.6 Simula and
Trannoy (2010) explicitly look at the tax schedule in this case7 and derive that individuals with
higher productivity can face lower (marginal) tax rates than individuals with lower productivity
if the possibility of migration increases in skills. That is, the progressivity of income taxation
can be expected to decrease in countries with an internationally mobile workforce.
Hypothesis 1 The higher the (potential) mobility of a country’s labor force, the lower the
personal income tax rates it faces (level effect). The tax schedule will become less progressive
when (potential) mobility is increasing in taxable income (shape effect).
In addition to this direct channel of labor mobility, there are also more indirect ones through
which economic integration affects personal income taxation. First, economic integration has
an effect on capital mobility and thereby capital income taxation.8 Reductions in the taxation
of capital income spill over to the taxation of personal income since personal income can be
partially reclassified as capital income, particularly at higher incomes. Thus, policy makers who
aim at discouraging such ”arbitrage” have to adjust personal income taxation in response to
capital tax competition. Furthermore, capital taxation affects the capital stock in an economy.
If the availability of capital affects the level and distribution of labor incomes, then the optimally
chosen tax schedule is again a function of capital taxation.
Second, economic integration affects governments budgets, e.g. as a result of capital tax
competition. When the previously optimal mix of tax instruments is no longer generating
sufficient tax revenues, governments may be forced to raise additional revenues by shifting a
higher burden to less mobile tax bases such as labor income (cf. Hines and Summers 2009).
6Abramitzky et al. (2012) document that a reverse pattern in the era of mass migration before World War
I and discuss some explanations for the subsequent reversal.
7Assuming that the correlation between skill level and income is sufficiently strong.
8See Wilson (1999) for a survey on this literature.
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Furthermore, economic integration may raise expenditure requirements (cf. Rodrik 1998), which
in turn may be met by adjustments in personal income taxation.
Third, economic integration implies an intensified exchange of goods and services and po-
tentially offshoring of jobs. The effects of integration on labor market outcomes have been a
well-studied phenomenon for some time.9 More recently, heterogenous effects across the income
distribution (”job market polarization” according to Autor et al. (2006)) have received growing
attention in the wake of research combining trade models à la Melitz with labor market match-
ing models.10 These combined models show that economic integration increases incomes at the
extremes of the income distribution, but erode those of the middle class. A policy maker who
is concerned about the distribution of disposable incomes should thus adjust the shape of the
tax schedule accordingly.
Since these indirect channels are not at the core of this paper, I restrict myself to controlling
for them without scrutinizing every chain of these arguments in detail.
2.2 Observed Labor Mobility vs. Potential Labor Mobility
In this paper, I analyze the link between the mobility of labor and the level and shape of personal
income tax systems. A rather straightforward approach is to use observed labor mobility as
main explanatory variable. However, in this case the issue of reverse causality potentially arises
since it is well possible that the degree to which governments seize individual income, e.g to
achieve redistributive aims, has an effect on individual migration decisions. Using data on
Israeli kibbutzim, Abramitzky (Abramitzky 2008, 2009) shows that an exogenous increase in
the extent of redistribution (i.e. an increase in taxation/contributions, given that kibbutzim
aim at equalizing consumption levels) induces highly skilled individuals to leave, i.e. emigrate,
and low-skilled to arrive, i.e. immigrate. Kleven et al. (2011) use a Danish scheme according to
which highly-skilled non-natives pay lower income taxes for the first three years of their stay.
They demonstrate that a significant share of them leaves the country as soon as this preferential
treatment expires.11 These results suggest that taxation affects location decisions. Therefore,
using actual labor flows as regressor can be expected to bias the estimates considerably upwards.
As a first empirical test for the validity of these concerns, I regress the top marginal tax rate
on two indicators for observed labor mobility, namely the rates of skilled and total emigration
as a measure of realized factor flows. Results are presented in Table 1.
In this rather reduced regression, both regressors have a statistically significant and positive
effect on the top marginal tax rate. At first sight, this seems to imply that observed labor
mobility leads to higher tax rates. However, in the light of reverse causality these results have
a rather different interpretation: Higher taxation induces emigration decisions. This first result
is in line with the theoretical prediction and highlights the need to cope with reverse causality.
Employing an index of potential labor mobility helps in tackling reverse causality. In addi-
9Compare Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, pp.582) for a survey on classic approaches to that topic.
10Compare e.g. Helpman et al. (2010a), Helpman et al. (2010b), and Helpman et al. (2011).
11When the tax scheme expires, the top marginal tax rate applied to immigrants’ incomes more than doubles.
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Table 1: Partial Correlations with Index
Dep. Var.:
Top Marginal Tax Rate
skilled emigration 1.62***
(0.31)
all emigration 2.23***
(0.57)
Cons 0.31*** 0.33***
(0.02) (0.03)
Country FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
R2overall 0.01 0.01
F-stat 68.16 65.02
Obs. 307 307
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sta-
tistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent
levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
tion to economic criteria, the index is based on indicators which are not under the control of
current tax policy, such as cultural and geographical proximity, family values, or the ability to
speak foreign languages. The index approximates migration decisions by relating the economic
and social benefits from moving to the costs associated with this action.
Hypothesis 2 Estimates using observed labor flows are upward biased, potentially reversing
the sign of the effect. Thus, it is necessary to use a measure of potential labor mobility instead
of observed mobility.
Using potential rather than actual labor flows as an explanatory variable has several several
further advantages: The index allows to account for the effects of strategic competition in per-
sonal income taxation. Strategic competition is well-documented in the case of capital taxation:
Policy makers react to increasing potential mobility of capital by adjusting tax systems such
that no capital flows occur. Suppose that strategic competition is also relevant in the area of
personal income taxation. Regressing income tax indicators on observed labor flows then yields
insignificant estimates, although labor mobility is causally affecting personal income taxation.
This problem can be tackled with my Index of Potential Labor Mobility since it represents the
economic concept on which policy makers base their decisions to adjust income taxation in the
case of strategic competition.
Furthermore, the index allows to link the empirical analysis closer to existing theory. In most
theoretical models of the effect of labor mobility on income taxation (e.g. Simula and Trannoy
(2010)), individuals incur a cost when relocating from one country to another. Economic
integration is then represented by reducing this cost. Although my Index of Potential Labor
Mobility does not measure the monetary costs of migration, it nonetheless represents a trade-off
between expected labor market success abroad and the current economic situation at home.
It is therefore an indicator for the economic net cost associated with migration and thus the
empirical counterpart of the core parameter in these models.
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3 Data
3.1 Index of Potential Labor Mobility
Developing a measure for the potential mobility of labor is one of the main contributions of this
paper. This index captures the value of the outside option, i.e. to start working in a country
other than the current country of residence. The more valuable this outside option, the more
credible is the threat of labor to migrate and thus the more responsive policy makers need to
be to prevent an erosion of a country’s tax base.
3.1.1 Determinants of Migration Decisions
The empirical literature on the determinants of migration has identified several economic and
non-economic factors as relevant for this decision. These can be grouped into push factors
(i.e. effects which make staying in the home country less attractive) and pull factors (i.e.
effects which make a particular country attractive as host). Ortega and Peri (2012) collect
data on annual migration flows between 120 sending countries and 15 OECD destinations
1980-2006. Using this data, they show that income per capita and immigration policies in
the destination are major determinants of migration flows. Grogger and Hanson (2011) look
at global migration to OECD countries and show that emigrants select into host countries
depending on the wage premium paid for their human capital. Mayda (2010) uses panel data
on bilateral migration flows to identify major drivers of inflows into 14 OECD countries 1980-
1995. The main determinants of labor flows are found to be economic opportunities in the
host country, geographical distance, and a young labor force in source countries. Mitchell et al.
(2011) conduct a similar analysis for inflows into the UK. They confirm a significant explanatory
power of economic conditions. In addition, they can explain roughly a quarter of overall flows by
former colonial ties and existing emigrant networks.12 Findings by Beine et al. (2011) confirm
the importance of networks: Using data on migration from almost all countries to 30 OECD
countries in 1990 and 2000, they conclude that the existence of immigrant communities in a
potential host makes migration considerably more likely. Bartz and Fuchs-Schündeln (2012)
show that language borders are a major obstacle to flows of labor within the European Union.
Two other papers focus on the interaction between economic and social factors in determining
the value of migration: Using US-(Lewis 2011) and Canadian data (Goldmann et al. 2011),
these papers show that the ability to communicate in the predominant language in a labor
market (English, but also French and Spanish) is crucial for the returns to immigrants’ human
capital. Results of all these papers stress the importance of economic and social integration
into host societies for migration decisions.
12Mitchell et al. (2011) provide a rather detailed and concise discussion of potential reason for migration.
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3.1.2 Construction of the Index
Based on the findings of the empirical literature, I focus on four components when measuring
the attractiveness of migrating to potential host countries: The first two measures how attrac-
tive it is for an individual to migrate to a specific other country by accounting for the economic
prosperity and openness to immigration of host countries. The third part measures the geo-
graphical and cultural proximity of source and host country. The fourth component relates to
characteristics of the national workforce affecting the likelihood to migrate, given opportunities
in other countries.
The first block deals with the economic situation in the potential host country. Here,
the wage level in the potential host country, the growth rate of host’s economy, and whether
the economic and legal conditions of host’s labor market allow to absorb new entrants play
a role.13 Second, the openness of a potential host country for new immigrants plays a role.
Issues such as impediments to acquiring a staying and working permit are a major determinant
of migration. However, comparable measures of legal openness are hard to generate. Thus
I focus on a set of measures to approximate openness to immigration such as attitudes to
immigration, the share of English speakers and and the share of foreign born in the population
(as a measure of past openness).14 Third, cultural and geographical proximity are included.
Cultural proximity captures the cost of integration into a new social environment. Factors such
as a common language, a common legal system, or a large number of immigrants from the source
country (immigrant network) can be expected to lower the costs associated with integration.
Geographical proximity is measured by the distance between source and host country and a
common border.
Even when there are several host countries which are attractive for potential immigrants,
international labor mobility requires labor to be willing to leave its current country of residence.
Therefore, the overall index adds to the measure for the attractiveness of potential hosts a
second measure for the general mobility of a nation’s workforce. First, it consists of a measure
for the share of non-native workers and English-speakers, both of which can be expected to
exhibit an above-average (return) mobility. Second, I add information on the strength of family
ties15 and the number of children which reduce the level of mobility.16 Third, I use the same
proxies for labor market conditions as used to describe host countries.
Expressed in formal terms, the index measuring the potential mobility of labor in country
13A further important economic determinant of mobility can be the portability of social security claims.
However, assessing the corresponding bilateral legal rules quantitatively is quite challenging, not at the core of
this paper, and thus left for further research.
14In a robustness check, I replace these proxies by a direct measure of legal barriers to immigration.
15Using Italian data, Alesina et al. (2011) show that individuals with strong family ties are less mobile, even
within a country.
16The strength of family ties and the number of children can also foster emigration when parts of the family
are already abroad and those left home are interested in a family reunion. Although a relevant channel, I do not
include it in my index, since it is hard to imagine why such family reunions should affect domestic tax policy.
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i at time t is constructed in the following way:
PLMit = max
j
[attractivenessjit · workforceit] (1)
= max
j
[
econ conditionjt · opennessjt · proximityijt · workforceit
]
with j denoting all countries but i.
Although all components are indexed by t, some indicators like the one for on cultural
and geographic proximity show very little time variation, if any. Similarly, most variation in
the sub-indices on openness to immigration and the mobility of the workforce is cross-sectional.
Therefore, most variation in the index over time stems from changes in the economic conditions
of host and source countries.
Concerning the construction of the index, I would like to draw attention to the fact that
the sub-categories of the index are linked multiplicatively, whereas the components within each
sub-category are combined in an additive way.17 Combining components within sub-categories
in an additive way reflects the view that these components are substitutes: Higher wages may
compensate for higher unemployment in a host country or a common border for a different
language. The multiplicative structure of the overall index, however, mirrors a complementary
view on the sub-categories: Good economic conditions in and proximity of a potential host are
of little worth if this country is not open to immigration, and vice versa.
Each component is restricted to take a value between zero and one for each potential host
country. In some cases (shares, rates, binary indicators) this is naturally given. In other cases
(e.g. growth rates and hourly wages) this is achieved by dividing all entries by the largest
value in the overall sample. Every sub-category contains at least one component that takes
strictly positive values. Therefore, the value for each host-origin pair is restricted to the domain
(0,1]. The same holds true for the index itself by construction. Choosing the value of the most
attractive host-origin pair as index value for a origin in a given year reflects that individuals
can only migrate to one other place at a time. Thus, only the best alternative counts and values
of countries which are dominated by the best one are irrelevant for an individual’s decision.
Reading the description of the composition of this index, one immediate concern comes to
mind, namely whether the criteria mentioned before apply to all kinds of potential emigrants.
Academic researchers or managers of large companies, for example, may base their location
decisions on rather different criteria. Franzoni et al. (2012) conduct a survey among more than
17,000 emigrant researchers asking them for their reasons to migrate. The reasons cited as
being most important were quite specific to the academic world (e.g. ”better availability of
research funds”) but still fit into the broad categories defined above.18 Furthermore, even if
reasons to migrate of these special groups were quite different from others, one should keep in
mind that these groups are too small to affect the whole income tax schedule. As Kleven et
al. (2011) document for foreign researchers and high income earners in Denmark and Kleven
17Definitions, sources, and weights for all components are listed in Table 7.
18See also Gibson and McKenzie (2011) who use panel data on very high-skilled individuals from New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, and Tonga to study determinants of migration and return decisions.
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Figure 1: Median, 75% range, and 95% range for Index of Potential Labor Mobility, yearly
averages across countries between 1986 and 2006, restricted to countries with observations in
all years; Source: Own calculations based on own index
et al. (forthcoming) for the taxation of European football players, such groups are more likely
to be targeted by preferential tax arrangements rather than a change in the entire income tax
system. Thus, the criteria introduced above seem to be of sufficient relevance for describing
mobility patterns affecting the shape and structure of national income tax systems
3.1.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Index
The index covers 26 OECD countries19 between 1986 and 2005. Due to lacking information
on some components of the index, there is no value of the index for some countries prior to
1994.20 Thus, there are in total 502 entries in the index. These entries take values between
virtually zero and roughly 0.13, averaging at 0.057. To put these values into perspective, one
should remember that by construction the index is bound by zero and one. This comparison
highlights that labor, although not immobile, is far less mobile than capital.21 On the other
19 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
20See Table 8 for the detailed data of the index.
21Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) estimate that, on average, non-domestic portfolio equity and FDI constitute
between 25 and 45 percent of total assets in industrial countries, 1985-2004. Although not directly comparable
to my index, these figures illustrate the high international mobility of capital.
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Figure 2: Median, 75% range, and 95% range for Index of Potential Labor Mobility, by source
country 1986 - 2006; Source: Own calculations based on own index
hand, however, the variation in labor mobility between OECD countries is more pronounced
than variation in capital mobility in the same group of countries.
When looking at the development of the index over time in Figure 1, one features catches
the eye: There is a general upwards trend in potential labor mobility, which accelerates after
2000. Furthermore, variation in potential mobility decreased after the fall of the Iron Curtain
but widened again over the last 5 years of the sample period.
To identify the drivers of this development, it is worthwhile to have a look at the values
of single countries in Figure 2. There are two main observations to be made when looking at
the raw data: First, variation across countries seems to be far more pronounced than variation
within countries. Second, one can broadly classify countries into high (index > 0.1), middle,
and low (index < 0.05) mobility ones. Low mobility countries are mostly found in Southern
Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic). On the other hand, most mobile countries belong to the
”anglo-saxon” group (Canada, Ireland, the UK, and the US) which is known for lower tax bur-
dens. These stylized facts lend some first tentative support to my initial assertion that potential
labor mobility has an effect on the taxation of labor incomes.
Figure 3 presents some graphical illustration of the relevance of the four sub components of
the index for the final value of the index. The four graphs show the values of the sub-indices
12
Figure 3: Plots of the four subcomponents of the index against the index. Source: Own
calculations based on own index
for the country pairs which enter the index. The relatively high values for each subindex show
that the low values for the overall index are mainly driven by its multiplicative composition.
Furthermore, the most attractive potential host seems to offer quite attractive economic con-
ditions (index values typically between 0.6 and 0.8) but the low mobility of the home labor
force drives down the whole index (values around 0.4). Values for the sub-index on proximity
look clustered, reflecting that the effects of common languages and a common border dominate
factors such as the inverse geographical distance.
Another important criterion for assessing the reliability of the Index of Potential Labor
Mobility is its correlation with actually observed flows of labor. From a theoretical point of view,
one would expect a positive relation between the two measures. For several reasons, however,
this relation should not be too strong as well: First, individual decisions about migration are
rather complex and more involved that the aggregate measures used for constructing this index.
Second, it takes time to realize changes in the fundamentals underlying migration decisions,
and additional time to process the new information. Third, when potential migration increases,
policy makers can enact measures to counter increasing outflows of labor. Finally, from an
econometric point of view, a high correlation might raise doubts on whether the Index of
Potential Labor Mobility helps curing the problems of reverse causality discussed above.
In Table 2 we look at the correlations between the index and the share of emigrants at
various skill levels. The correlation coefficient is strongly positive in all cases, but not too high
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Table 2: Correlation between Actual Emigration and Index of Potential Mobility
Index of Potential Labor Mobility
(L0) (L1) (L2) (L3) (L4) (L5)
Skilled Emigration 0.257 0.258 0.261 0.265 0.272 0.281
(339) (314) (289) (264) (239) (234)
All Emigration 0.275 0.276 0.278 0.280 0.283 0.287
(339) (314) (289) (264) (239) (234)
Number of observations in parenthesis. (L1) denotes the first lag of
the index, and so on. Sources: Own index and emigration data from
Defoort (2006).
as to raise concerns on reverse causality. Furthermore, the size of the correlation is increasing
in the number of lags. This suggests that it takes time for changes in migration possibilities to
translate into actual labor relocations. Thus, the index meets the criteria stated above.
3.2 Tax System Indicators
The data to describe the shape of countries’ personal income tax schedules is taken from
Peter et al. (2010). This data set provides information on average and marginal tax rates
an individual faces when earning multiples of nominal national GDP per capita. These rates
account for tax allowances and deductions, tax credits, and significant local taxes. Since they
cannot account for allowances granted on the basis of individual characteristics such as marriage
status or the number of children, the tax data represents effective tax rates for single individuals.
Furthermore, the data set contains the top marginal tax rate and some descriptive statistics on
the progressivity of the tax schedule. It covers more than one hundred countries on a yearly
basis between 1981 and 2005.
The main advantage of this data set is that it provides information on various relevant
indicators on the taxation of incomes above average GDP per capita which is comparable both
across countries and time. On the downside, however, we learn nothing about the taxation
of incomes below average GDP per capita. Information on incomes below average GDP is
relevant since it covers a considerable part of tax payers, although it is less relevant in terms
of corresponding tax revenues. Furthermore, information on tax payments covers only parts
of individuals’ gross contributions to financing governments (social security payments, e.g., are
omitted) and an even smaller part of net contributions, since the data totally abstracts from
transfers or public good provision.22 However, net contributions cannot be calculated without
detailed individual level data.
Figure 4 shows some descriptive statistics on average tax rates for incomes at multiples of
national GDP per capita. Two main features come to mind when looking at the dispersion of
average tax rates in Figure 4: First, the variation in the tax rates has decreased considerably
since the mid 1980s, in particular at higher income levels.23 Second, there has been a general
downward trend in average tax rates at all four tax levels since the mid 1980s, and particularly
22The focus on gross contributions is a common feature of empirical papers on (capital) tax competition.
23The low tax rates for high income earners are from Chile, Korea, and Mexico.
14
Figure 4: Median, 75% range, and 95% range for average tax rates at different income levels;
Source: Own calculations based on Peter et al. (2010)
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after 2000. These were also the periods of most pronounced increases in the Index of Potential
Labor Mobility.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Effect of Potential Labor Mobility on Personal Income Tax-
ation
In this section, I test the hypotheses stated above in a first set of regressions. Here, as in
the following regressions, I employ five dependent variables: First, the effective average tax
rate (EATR) at incomes of average GDP per capita, at twice the average GDP per capita,
three times and four times. Second, the top marginal tax rate. Although Peter et al. (2010)
provides additional information on marginal effective tax rates, I focus on EATRs since the
different types of tax rates are relevant in different decision situations: The effective average
tax rate is particularly relevant for decisions at the extensive margin, i.e. whether to work at all.
The focus of this study is on these tax measures because the decision at the extensive margin
corresponds to the migration decision in an international context. The top marginal tax rate
is included since it is quite relevant for individuals at the very end of the income distribution
and furthermore of particular political interest.
Expressed in formal terms, the regression equation which I estimate subsequently takes the
following functional form:
taxit = α + βIndexLaborMobilityit + γXit + µi + νt + it (2)
where i denotes the country and t the year. tax is one of the five tax indicators and Xit the
set of controls. The set of controls is the same for all tax indicators in a given specification but
may vary for all of them across specifications. The main focus of the regressions is on obtaining
estimates for β.
In the first set of regressions, I regress each of these five tax indicators on the Index of
Potential Labor Mobility and several political control variables. A first focus on political
controls seems reasonable, since tax policy is known to be a major issue in the political arena
and driven by many non-economic considerations. The control variables focus on time-varying
characteristics of the political system such as the political orientation of the central government,
institutional constraints on the government, and the legislative fractionalization. Indicators on
constitutional aspects (e.g. presidential system) are not included as they show hardly any
variation in my sample and are thus absorbed by country fixed effects.
Results of the regressions are presented in Table 3. The estimates for the Index of Potential
Labor Mobility support my hypothesis: They are all significantly negative, and the stronger the
higher the income at which the estimation is performed.24 The latter is in line with predictions
24As a caveat, one should note that the estimates for the effect of potential labor mobility at different points
of the tax schedule are not statistically different.
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Table 3: Regressions with Political Controls
Dependant Variable:
Average effective tax rate at income of Top marg. tax rate
1 x GDP p.c. 2 x GDP p.c. 3 x GDP p.c. 4 x GDP p.c.
index of labor mobility -1.77*** -2.10*** -2.21*** -2.20*** -2.33***
(0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.37)
left government -0.00 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
institutional constraints -0.01** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
legislative fractionalization -0.09** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.14**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
constant 0.38*** 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.77***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
R2adj. 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.32
F-stat 22.29 31.44 37.59 40.65 55.64
Obs. 420 420 420 420 422
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** ,
resp.
given that high-income earners are internationally more mobile.
The political controls are in line with expectations: Left governments reduce the tax burden
at the lower end of the taxable income distribution (although not statistically significantly)
and increase taxes on the rich. Governments operating under more severe institutional and
legislative constraints impose lower taxes on their citizens. The latter effect might reflect more
institutional inertia.
However, political variables are not the only determinants of tax policy. When setting the
tax policy, policy makers also need to account for the state of the economy (economic growth,
GDP per capita, unemployment), characteristics of the population (dependency ratio, degree of
urbanization, population density), or the economic structure of the economy (capital intensity
of production, share of employees in service sector). Thus, I include all these regressors in
estimations presented in Table 4.25
Not surprisingly, the size of the estimated coefficients for the Index of Potential Labor
Mobility decrease considerably, but remain significantly negative. Still, the economic size of
the coefficient is non-negligible: Germany is the country with the greatest absolute change in
mobility (+0.07). This change corresponds to a reduction in the top marginal tax rate of about
5 percentage points, accounting for roughly a third of the reduction in this tax rate observed
in the sample period.
Turning to the economic controls, four variables seem to be of particular relevance: Economies
with a lower dependency ratio charge their workers lower taxes (i.e. finance a given budget
requirement more evenly). Richer economies charge lower taxes on labor, potentially reflecting
25Two of the economic control variables (GDP growth and unemployment, both in the source country) are
also part of the Index of Potential Labor Mobility since they affect both domestic taxation and migration
decisions. To counter concerns about collinearity, I re-estimate all regressions in Table 4, dropping these two
economic controls from the estimations. As a result, the size of my coefficients of interest increases slightly, but
qualitative results are unaffected.
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Table 4: Regressions with Economic and Political Controls
Dependant Variable:
Average effective tax rate at income of Top marg. tax rate
1 x GDP p.c. 2 x GDP p.c. 3 x GDP p.c. 4 x GDP p.c.
index of labor mobility -1.17*** -1.18*** -1.20*** -1.06*** -0.76*
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.45)
left government -0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
institutional constraints 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
legislative fractionalization -0.05 -0.10** -0.12** -0.13*** -0.11*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
real GDP per capita -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP growth 0.20** 0.19** 0.20** 0.19** 0.17*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
unemployment rate -0.33*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.45*** -0.05
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
capital intensity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
employment share of service -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.79***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
population density 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
rural population -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
population aged 15-64 -0.28 -0.56** -0.58** -0.54* -0.13
(0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.33)
constant 0.45** 0.88*** 1.02*** 1.09*** 1.48***
(0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
R2adj. 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.42
F-stat 11.64 15.28 17.07 18.29 27.94
Obs. 416 416 416 416 418
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** ,
resp.
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a more balanced use of various tax instruments. Economies with growth rates above their
long-run average levy higher taxes on their workers. With progressive tax schedules, this obser-
vation can be rationalized by the effect of the so-called cold progression. Finally, a higher level
of unemployment is associated with lower taxes on labor. This observation can be rationalized
if contributions to unemployment insurance and taxation of labor incomes are substitutes, i.e.
higher financial need of the unemployment insurance system force the policy makers to partly
compensate individuals with lower taxes on labor income.26
In general, the regressions presented support to the main hypothesis of this paper: An
increasing ability of an economy’s workforce to emigrate to other countries induces governments
to lower taxes on labor income in order to counter an erosion of the tax base. However, the
adjustments in personal income taxes do not differ across income levels although high-skilled
individuals, typically earning higher incomes, are known to be relatively more mobile than
low-skilled ones. Thus, there is no evidence of a reduction in the progressivity of the personal
income tax schedule.
4.2 Robustness
After having presented the baseline results, I turn to some robustness checks in order to validate
my results against potentially confounding effects of other channels. In the first two robustness
checks, I turn to the indirect channel through which economic integration might affect taxes
on personal income: Either through changes in the general budgetary requirements or via the
prevention of arbitrage between capital and personal income taxation. Therefore, I include
measures of general government outlays and receipts (Robustness 1) and of revenues from
corporate income taxation (Robustness 2) into the previous set of regressions. Estimation
results presented in Table 5 suggest the relevance of these additional indirect channels: The
size of estimated coefficients decreases slightly. Most importantly, the general pattern remains
unchanged, suggesting that the previously measured effects were not driven by the indirect
channels. One caveat, however, has to apply here: In these robustness checks, I measure
capital and indirect taxation as the shares of their revenues in GDP. Constant shares do not
imply that the tax burden imposed on an individual with a given income remains unchanged.
One can have, e.g., a revenue neutral shift in the burden of indirect taxes by reducing the set of
goods taxed at a lower rate or even exempted from indirect taxes. Similarly, the introduction
of dual income taxes can reduce the tax burden of those with high capital incomes. These shifts
are accounted for neither in my dependent variable nor in capital tax revenues. Coping with
these caveats would require information on individual capital income and consumption baskets
across the income distribution, what is both beyond the scope of this paper.
Another issue of concern relates to the question whether the Index of Potential Labor
Mobility measures a distinct feature of economic integration or whether it serves as proxy
for general economic integration. Therefore, I test in the third and fourth robustness check
26Of course, there are a lot more ways of interpreting results for controls when taking account of reverse
causality.
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Table 5: Robustness
Dependant Variable:
Average effective tax rate at income of Top marg. tax rate
1 x GDP p.c. 2 x GDP p.c. 3 x GDP p.c. 4 x GDP p.c.
Robustness 1: Budget Incidence
index of labor mobility -1.15*** -1.14*** -1.13*** -0.99** -0.68
(0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.46)
government outlays -0.15* -0.16 -0.21** -0.23** -0.44***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
government receipts 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.31**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
R2adj. 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.40
Obs. 416 416 416 416 418
Robustness 2: Other Tax Revenues
index of labor mobility -1.14*** -1.16*** -1.15*** -1.01** -0.76*
(0.36) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.45)
Corporate Income Tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Indirect Taxes -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2adj. 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.41
Obs. 413 413 413 413 415
Robustness 3: Other Integration Measure
index of labor mobility -1.20*** -1.21*** -1.22*** -1.09*** -0.91**
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.45)
economic globalization 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.02 -0.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
R2adj. 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.42
Obs. 416 416 416 416 418
Robustness 4: Actual Emigration Flows
skilled emigration 0.56** 0.77*** 0.83*** 0.78*** -0.24
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
R2adj. 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.55
Obs. 395 395 395 395 399
Robustness 5: Heterog. Effects for Gov.s with Diff. Pol. Orientation
index of labor mobility -1.10*** -1.14*** -1.20*** -1.09*** -0.85*
(0.36) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.48)
(index) x (left government) -0.26 -0.16 -0.05 0.01 0.03
(0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.25)
left government 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
R2adj. 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.38
Obs. 416 416 416 416 418
Robustness 6: Sum of all Hosts in Measure of Potential Labor Mobility
Sum of Labor Mobility -0.19** -0.16* -0.17* -0.18* -0.25**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
R2adj. 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.39
Obs. 416 416 416 416 418
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions contain the same set of controls as in Table 4. In addition,
Robustness 1 controls for government outlays and receipts in per cent of GDP, Robustness 2 for government revenues
from corporate income taxation and indirect taxation in per cent of GDP, Robustness 3 for a broad measure on
economic globalization, and Robustness 4 for the share of skilled emigrants in countries populations. Robustness
5 includes interaction between index and political orientation of government. Robustness 6 replaces the index of
potential labor mobility by the sum of all hosts. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *,
**, *** , resp.
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whether the inclusion of a broad measure of economic integration (Dreher 2006) affects the
estimates for the index, and whether the same pattern of coefficients can be obtained by using
actual emigration rates instead of the Index of Potential Labor Mobility. Results in Table 5
show that neither of the two concerns is of empirical relevance. Adding the broad measure
of economic integration has hardly any effect on the size or the statistical significance of the
coefficients.27 Furthermore, actual emigration measures yield significantly positive estimation
coefficients, lending empirical support to my concerns about reverse causality.
In Robustness 5, I look at potential heterogeneity in the effect of potential labor mobil-
ity on tax burdens. Using survey data on German members of parliament, Heinemann and
Janeba (2011) show that the perception of factor mobility strongly depends on MP’s political
orientation. Thus, the political orientation of governments can shape its reaction to changes in
potential labor mobility. Thus, I add an interaction term between the Index of Potential Mobil-
ity and the measure for the political orientation of the government to my estimation. However,
this interaction turns out to be insignificant, lending no further support to this hypothesis.
In the sixth robustness check, I replace the index by another measure of potential mobility.
This version of the index contains the sum of all values of migrating to potential hosts rather
than the maximal value as before. The idea behind this alternative measure is that, in reality,
we observe people migrating to a lot of different places. Apparently, there is a heterogenous
evaluation of or a heterogeneity in preferences for the situation in other countries. Since policy
makers can enact only one single tax code, they need to take account of the attractiveness of
a variety of potential host countries. Furthermore, the index can take higher values when the
number of countries increases, reflecting that a higher number of countries expands the choice
set of a potential migrator. Results of regressions when replacing the maximal value of labor
mobility by the sum of values for all hosts are presented in Robustness 6. As it turns out,
qualitative results are robust to this alternative specification of the index.
In the seventh robustness check, I use a further alternative specification of the index. In
this version of the index, I replace the set of proxies for openness to immigration28 by a direct
measure of legal impediments to immigration. This direct measure is taken from Ortega and
Peri (2012), which is, to my knowledge, the only paper providing a quantitative account of
immigration laws. They normalize every country to zero in 1980 and increase this score by
one if a country’s legislation passed a law reducing barriers to immigration, and vice versa. In
principle, this is the measure to be directly included in my index. However, I restrict myself to
use it merely as robustness check for two reasons: First, it does not account for the effects of
the new law, since every change is coded in the same way. Countries score the better, the more
they slice legal changes into small laws. Second, it covers only fifteen countries.29. That is, I
restrict the set of potential host countries even further. The results of robustness check 7 are
presented in Table 6. The size of the estimated coefficients grows slightly, but the alternative
27Estimates yield the same qualitative results when including the measure by Dreher (2006) alone instead
using it together with my index, as in Robustness 3.
28Compare Table 7 in the appendix.
29Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
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Table 6: Robustness (continued)
Dependant Variable:
Average effective tax rate at income of Top marg. tax rate
1 x GDP p.c. 2 x GDP p.c. 3 x GDP p.c. 4 x GDP p.c.
Robustness 7: Index with Immigration Laws
index of labor mobility -0.48*** -0.33* -0.38* -0.40** -0.78***
(0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23)
R2adj. 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.43
Obs. 416 416 416 416 416
Robustness 8: Measure of Trade Effects on Wages
index of labor mobility -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.43***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Heckscher-Ohlin Effect 0.47 0.40 0.25 0.19 -0.70***
(0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.23)
R2adj. 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.43
Obs. 258 258 258 258 260
Robustness 9: Interaction between Skills of Workforce and Index
index of labor mobility -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.39***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
(index) x (dummy high-skill) -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.12**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
R2adj. 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.49
Obs. 265 265 265 265 267
Robustness 10: Alternative Index
low-skilled labor mobility -0.50 -1.80 -1.71 -1.05 4.29**
(1.44) (1.53) (1.56) (1.58) (1.71)
high-skilled labor mobility 26.20*** 27.43** 24.43** 18.64* -23.52**
(10.04) (10.65) (10.86) (11.00) (11.73)
R2adj. 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.48
Obs. 418 418 418 418 420
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions contain the same set of controls as in Table 4. Robustness 7 uses
a modification of the Index of Potential Labor Mobility with a measure of legal barriers to immigration. Robustness
8 includes a measure of the Heckscher-Ohlin effect. In Robustness 9, an interaction of the index with a dummy
indicating an above-median share of individuals with tertiary education in total workforce is added. In Robustness
10, the Index of Potential Labor Mobility is replaced by an alternatively constructed index as described in App. B.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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specification of the index does not change the qualitative results.
In robustness check 8, I investigate the third indirect channel from economic integration
to personal income taxation: The effects of trade in goods on the distribution of domestic
incomes. Unfortunately, data availability limits my ability to test the implications of trade
effects, as theories stressing the heterogeneity of firms or workers require more disaggregated
data. However, classical models such as Heckscher-Ohlin can be tested in principle. In these
tests one should keep in mind, however, that the expected effects concentrate on individuals
with low incomes (unskilled labor as scarce factor) which are not covered by the tax data I use.
The indicator for the Heckscher-Ohlin effect is constructed by interacting the share of trade
with non-OECD countries and the share of the workforce with primary education.30 Estimation
results show that qualitative results are not affected.
In the ninth robustness check, I control for whether the strength of the effect of labor
mobility depends on the skill structure of the workforce, as high-skilled individuals are known
to be more mobile. To test for this effect, I construct a dummy which takes the value one if an
economy’s workforce has an above-median share of workers with tertiary education, and zero
otherwise.31 Then, I interact this dummy with the Index of Potential Labor Mobility. Results
presented in Robustness 9 indicate that the estimates for the index itself remain qualitatively
unchanged. The interaction term is insignificant, suggesting that the strength of the effect of
potential labor mobility on taxes is not moderated by the skill composition of the workforce.
So far, I have imposed exogenous weights on the different components on my Index of
Potential Labor Mobility. Although based on existing literature, this rather ad hoc approach
can hardly be beyond reproach. To counter concerns about exogenous weights driving my
estimation results, I present an alternative version of the index in which weights are obtained
by regressing observed migration on the set of explanatory variables described above. The data
on observed migration is taken from Docquier et al. (2011). They collect information on stocks
of bilateral migration between 194 countries in the years 1990 and 2000. Furthermore, Docquier
et al. (2011) distinguish between migrants with college and below-college education.
This approach has several advantages over my previous strategy: First, weights do no longer
depend on my opinion on appropriate weighting. Second, since data covers both different skill
levels and different years, estimated weights can vary along these two dimensions. Varying
weight allow to increase variation over time relative to variation between countries. Further-
more, different weights for different skill groups should facilitate the identification of shape
effects.
However, there are also disadvantages associated with the estimation of weights: First,
they do not follow a clear economic concept and are thus less closely linked to the theory on
determinants of migration. Second, and more important, estimated weights provide a better
fit to observed mobility, not potential mobility. In previous sections, I have argued why these
30Data is taken from OECDstat (trade) and the Key Indicators of the Labour Market (ILO, 7th ed.), resp.
The KILM data set starts only in 1988 and does not provide information for every country in my data set for
every year.
31Data based on Table 14a (age groups older than 15 and both sexes) from the Key Indicators of the Labour
Market (7th ed.), provided by the International Labor Organisation.
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two concepts are different (e.g. because of strategic interaction) and why measures of observed
mobility are more prone to issues of reverse causality. Therefore, estimated weights provide
additional information and increase the replicability of results at the price of increasing concerns
of reverse causality. Details on the construction of this alternative index and some descriptives
can be found in appendix B.
These indicators for low-skilled and high-skilled labor mobility are then used to estimate the
effect of labor mobility on personal income taxation. Regressions are analogous to the ones in
Table 4, except for replacing the Index of Potential Labor Mobility by the alternative measures
of labor mobility.
Results presented in Robustness 10 show two distinct features: First, the estimates of the
effect of low-skilled mobility are insignificant. Non-significant effects of low-skilled mobility
can be interpreted in the light of often limited knowledge spill-overs from low-skilled and often
negligible net contributions to the government budget. Second, estimates of the effect of high-
skilled mobility are significant, but positive. This effect is apparently driven by reverse causality.
We have already touched the issue of reverse causality when using observed migration data in
Robustness 4 in Table 5. When using the Index of Potential Labor Mobility in Table 4, I
could identify the effect of labor mobility on personal income taxation because the values of
the index showed a sufficiently low correlation with observed migration data. The alternative
index, however, is constructed by weighting its components to fit observed migrant stocks as
good as possible. Apparently, the fit is sufficiently good to cause problems of reverse causality.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I quantify the effect of labor mobility on personal income taxation in OECD
countries between 1986 and 2005. Using observed migration as explanatory variable creates
severe problems of reverse causality, as I demonstrate in this paper. Furthermore, observed
flows do not allow to account for effects of strategic tax competition. To tackle both problems I
create a new Index of Potential Labor Mobility. This new index is based on existing evidence on
determinants of migration decisions and consists of components which are (in the short-run) not
influenced by government tax policy. In addition to handling the problem of reverse causality,
this index also allows to quantify the extent of labor mobility which used to be assumed to be
zero in the tax competition literature.
I find robust empirical support for the hypothesis that labor mobility reduces effective
average tax rates on personal income. In the case of Germany, the country with the largest
increase in the sample period, higher labor mobility reduced effective average tax rates by at
least five percentage points, accounting for roughly a third of the overall reduction since the
mid 80s. However, I do not find evidence for heterogenous reductions across the distribution
of taxable income. This result is somewhat unexpected given that high income earners are
known to be most mobile. The absence of heterogenous effects might reflect political economy
considerations in tax setting. In addition to exploring this channel more deeply, it might also
24
be worthwhile to employ more elaborate estimation methods as more comprehensive data on
migration flows becomes available.
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A Supplementary Information on Index for Potential La-
bor Mobility
A.1 Description of Variables in Index for Potential Labor Mobility
Economic Growth Indicator of the economic growth rate in potential host countries. First,
the minimal value of this indicator is added to ensure the non-negativity of the index. Second,
the index is normalized by dividing all values by the maximum, such that all values are bound
by zero and one, with one describing the maximal growth rate.
Hourly Wages Based on exchange rate converted measures of average hourly wages in man-
ufacturing, provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Normalization analogously to ”Eco-
nomic Growth”. Missing values are imputed using data on real per capita GDP, taken from the
Penn World Tables 7.0 (analogously constructed). These GDP values show a correlation with
average hourly wages of 0.79 in my sample.
Employment Ratio Share of the total labor force that is in any kind of official employment.
Labor Market Flexibility Based on the employment protection index of the OECD. Con-
sists of 21 items measuring the costs and procedures associated with individual or collective
firings as well as obstacles to temporary employment. Values between 0 (no employment pro-
tection) and 6 (extreme employment protection). Recoded by a linear transformation to take
values between 0 (extreme employment protection) and 1 (no employment protection). An
extensive discussion of the underlying data is provided by Venn (2009).
Openness to Immigration Based on questions on openness to immigration from the 2003
wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2003). Average with equal weights
of responses to ”Immigrants increase crime rate” (v50), ”Immigrants are generally good for
[COUNTRY’S] economy” (v51), ”Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in
[COUNTRY]” (v52), and ”Immigrants improve [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] society by bring-
ing in new ideas and cultures” (v53). If necessary, answers were recoded such that higher values
indicate more openness to immigration. In the last step linearly scaled down to the range [0,1],
with 1 indicating maximal openness to immigration.
Share of Foreign Born Based on data on migrant stocks from the World Development Indi-
cators of the World Bank. Provides information on the share of foreign-born in countries’ total
populations. Data available every five years for each country, separately linearly interpolated
within each gap.
Share of English Speakers Share of individuals in the total population who have a knowl-
edge of English sufficient for at least basic conversations. Single cross-section for early 2000s.
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Common Language Indicator that takes the value 1 if a language is the mother tongue of
at least 9 per cent of the population in both countries of a country pair, zero otherwise.
Common Legal System Based on La Porta et al. (1999). Indicator that takes the value
1 if two countries have a legal system of the same origin, zero otherwise. Legal systems are:
British, French, Socialist, German, Scandinavian.
Immigrant Networks Based on data of bilateral migration stocks in 1990 from Ortega and
Peri (2012). A network of migrants from a source country i in a host country j is measured as
the ratio of migrants from source i living in host j over the total population in source i.
Common Border Indicator that takes the value 1 if two countries share a common inland
border, zero otherwise.
Inverse Geographical Distance Calculates the bilateral distance between two countries
based on distances between their biggest agglomerations. These inter-agglomeration distances
are weighted by the share of the agglomeration in country’s overall population. To obtain
an inverse measure (i.e. larger values indicating greater proximity) between zero and one,
I calculate invdistij =
min(distwij)
distwij
, where distwij is the measure of the population-weighted
distance between countries i and j provided by the CEPII-dataset, and min(distwij) is the
smallest value for all i, j (i 6= j) in this data set.
Number of Children Measured by the share of individuals aged 0-14 in the total population.
Family Values Based on the questions on ”More Emphasis on Family Life” and ”How im-
portant is family in your life” from the first four waves of the World Values Survey. Highest
agreement is coded as one, highest disagreement as zero, values assigned linearly in between.
Values for each country in each year are obtained by summing the frequency-weighted answers.
When both questions have been asked, the un-weighted average of both questions is used. When
only one question has been asked, this response is taken for the overall index. Missing values
are filled by fitting a fourth-order polynomial separately on the data for each country. Means of
actual data and of fitted values are not statistically significantly different for any country used
in this analysis. Values are finally normalized as before such that they are between 0 and 1,
with 1 corresponding to minimal possible family attachment and 0 to maximal possible family
attachment.
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Table 7: Components of Index for Potential Labor Mobility
Sub-Category Component Weight Specific to Mean Std Min Max Obs. Source
Economic Conditions Hourly Wages in Manufacturing 1/4 Host 0.35 0.2 0.05 1 16841 Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Penn Tables)
Economic Growth 1/4 Host 0.65 0.08 0 0.92 16762 Heston et al. (2011)
Employment Ratio 1/4 Host 0.92 0.04 0.76 0.99 15234 OECD Stat
Labor Market Flexibility 1/4 Host 0.65 0.17 0.3 0.96 13186 OECD Stat
Openness of Host Openness to Immigration 1/3 Host 0.6 0.05 0.47 0.69 13088 ISSP (2003)
Share of Foreign Born 1/3 Host 0.1 0.09 0.01 0.38 15130 World Development Indicators
Share of English Speakers 1/3 Host 0.55 0.31 0.05 0.98 17160 Crystal (2003), EuropeanCommission (2006)
(Cultural) Proximity Common Language 1/6 Host/Origin 0.1 0.29 0 1 17160 Head et al. (2010)
Common Legal System 1/6 Host/Origin 0.2 0.4 0 1 17160 Head et al. (2010)
Immigrant Networks 1/6 Host/Origin 0 0.01 0 0.14 17160 Ortega and Peri (2012)
(Geographical) Proximity Common Border 1/4 Host/Origin 0.07 0.26 0 1 17160 Head et al. (2010)
Inverse Geographical Distance 1/4 Host/Origin 0.01 0.02 0 0.13 17160 Head et al. (2010)
Characteristics of Workforce Number of Children 1/12 Origin 0.81 0.03 0.71 0.86 17160 OECDstat
Family Values 1/12 Origin 0.06 0.03 0 0.19 17160 World Values Survey
Non-native Workers 1/6 Origin 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.34 17160 World Development Indicators
Share of English Speakers 1/6 Origin 0.55 0.31 0.05 0.98 17160 Crystal (2003), EuropeanCommission (2006)
Hourly Wages in Manufacturing 1/6 Origin 0.41 0.19 0.06 1 17160 Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Penn Tables)
Economic Growth 1/6 Origin 0.65 0.06 0.44 0.9 17160 Heston et al. (2011)
Unemployment Rate 1/6 Origin 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.24 17160 OECD Stat
All values are either naturally defined on [0,1] or normalized to that range. Sample consists of observations at host-origin pair level. Observations were dropped from sample when (a) there was no full
information on origin in a given year or (b) there was not a single host country with full information in a given year.
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Table 8: Data of Index of Potential Labor Mobility
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 avg. ∆ ’86-’05
Australia 0.057 0.060 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.070 0.073 0.078 0.065 0.021
Austria 0.085 0.092 0.089 0.084 0.087 0.085 0.084 0.082 0.085 0.092 0.100 0.101 0.090 0.016
Belgium 0.069 0.073 0.078 0.077 0.082 0.079 0.081 0.078 0.085 0.089 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.089 0.086 0.084 0.087 0.095 0.105 0.106 0.086 0.037
Canada 0.098 0.103 0.106 0.107 0.105 0.102 0.106 0.107 0.110 0.109 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.114 0.116 0.109 0.110 0.117 0.124 0.129 0.111 0.031
Czech Rep. 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.006
Denmark 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.032 0.017
Finland 0.047 0.050 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.059 0.065 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.058 0.059 0.065 0.072 0.074 0.059 0.027
France 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.053 0.055 0.054 0.053 0.051 0.053 0.056 0.061 0.061 0.047 0.040
Germany 0.035 0.083 0.084 0.083 0.089 0.095 0.092 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.086 0.093 0.100 0.101 0.087 0.066
Greece 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.019 0.009
Hungary 0.007 0.008 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.025 0.024
Ireland 0.089 0.095 0.099 0.100 0.102 0.096 0.099 0.099 0.102 0.107 0.108 0.111 0.107 0.111 0.109 0.108 0.111 0.116 0.123 0.129 0.107 0.040
Italy 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.050 0.050 0.046 0.050 0.052 0.051 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.052 0.057 0.056 0.046 0.029
Japan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.014 0.020
Luxembourg 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.046 0.048 0.041 0.011
Netherlands 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.030 0.023
New Zealand 0.057 0.060 0.063 0.062 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.061 0.065 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.071 0.074 0.079 0.065 0.022
Norway 0.050 0.055 0.057 0.060 0.063 0.062 0.061 0.060 0.065 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.065 0.071 0.075 0.065 0.068 0.076 0.086 0.089 0.068 0.039
Poland 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.005
Portugal 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.021 0.008
Slovak Rep. 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.027 0.004
Spain 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.028 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.006
Sweden 0.050 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.057 0.061 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.062 0.067 0.071 0.061 0.063 0.071 0.080 0.084 0.065 0.034
Switzerland 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.073 0.078 0.076 0.071 0.073 0.072 0.071 0.069 0.072 0.079 0.086 0.087 0.074 0.024
UK 0.085 0.090 0.094 0.094 0.097 0.091 0.094 0.094 0.097 0.102 0.103 0.107 0.104 0.109 0.109 0.107 0.111 0.115 0.122 0.128 0.104 0.043
US 0.094 0.099 0.102 0.103 0.101 0.098 0.102 0.101 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.104 0.109 0.112 0.105 0.107 0.114 0.120 0.125 0.106 0.031
avg. 0.046 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.057 0.054 0.051 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.061 0.066 0.068
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Definition Source
index of labor mobility 0.06 0.03 0 0.13 416 see Appendix A.1 own calculation
sum of labor mobility 0.2 0.12 0 0.48 416 see Appendix A.1 own calculation
avg. eff. tax rate at 1xGDP pc 0.18 0.09 0 0.47 416 see source Peter et al. (2010)
avg. eff. tax rate at 2xGDP pc 0.27 0.1 0.05 0.62 416 see source Peter et al. (2010)
avg. eff. tax rate at 3xGDP pc 0.32 0.1 0.1 0.68 416 see source Peter et al. (2010)
avg. eff. tax rate at 4xGDP pc 0.36 0.09 0.15 0.71 416 see source Peter et al. (2010)
top marg. tax rate 0.42 0.14 0.12 0.72 416 see source Peter et al. (2010)
left government 0.27 0.44 0 1 416 1 if government dominated by left-wing parties, 0 else Armingeon et al. (2011)
institutional constraints 2.45 1.32 0 5 416 number of veto players Armingeon et al. (2011)
legislative fractionalization 0.68 0.11 0.41 0.89 416 = 1−∑mi=1 s2i , where si: share of seats for party i, m: number of parties Armingeon et al. (2011)
real GDP per capita 23.37 8.52 7.56 68.91 416 in tsd of USD, PPP converted OECD stat
GDP growth 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.22 416 annual growth rate of nominal GDP OECD stat
unemployment rate 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.24 416 share of registered unemployed in civilian labor force OECD stat
capital intensity 0.17 0.76 0 7.98 416 capital in production per worker, in tsd. of USD OECD stat
employment share of service 0.66 0.07 0.43 0.79 416 share of workers in service sector in civilian labor force OECD stat
population density 130.24 125.84 2.09 483.41 416 inhabitants per km2 OECD stat
rural population 0.25 0.11 0.03 0.54 416 share of rural population in total population OECD stat
population aged 15-64 0.67 0.02 0.6 0.70 416 share of population aged 15-64 in total population OECD stat
government outlays 0.46 0.08 0.31 0.71 416 share of government outlays in GDP OECD stat
government receipts 0.44 0.08 0.28 0.63 416 share of government receipts (ex. debt) in GDP OECD stat
corporate income taxation 3.15 1.47 0.27 11.74 413 share of revenue in GDP OECD stat
indirect taxation 10.89 2.96 3.67 17.22 416 share of revenue in GDP OECD stat
economic globalization 0.77 0.12 0.44 0.99 416 see source Dreher (2006)
skilled emigration 0.08 0.07 0 0.38 307 see source Defoort (2006)
year 1995.85 5.68 1986 2005 416
Descriptives for sample used to estimate regressions with EATRs as dependent variable in Table 4
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B Estimation of Weights and Descriptives for the Alterna-
tive Index of Labor Mobility
The weights for the alternatively constructed Index of Labor Mobility are derived by regressing
measures of observed migration on the components of the Index of Potential Labor Mobility.
Data on migration is taken from Docquier et al. (2011) who provide information on bilateral
migration stocks for 194 countries in 1990 and 2000. This data distinguishes between migrants
with at least college education (high-skilled) and those without a corresponding degree (low-
skilled). Information on the regressors can be found in Table 7 in the appendix. To allow for
some comparison between both indices, I use the share of migrants in the total population of
the sending country rather than the number of migrants as dependent variable. Using this data
has the advantage that I can link information on both the host and the origin country to each
observation. On the downside, Docquier et al. (2011) provide information on stocks rather than
flows. Furthermore, one would like to calculate the ration of high-skilled migrants over the high-
skilled population rather than the total population. However, data on the skill composition of
native populations in all OECD countries over the last two decades is not available.
Results from regressing migration shares on the set of explanatory variables are presented in
Table 10 in the appendix. Looking a the effects of specific regressors, labor market flexibility in
the destination country and a common legal systems show the most consistent pattern across
time and skill groups in fostering migration. Other factors are of significance only in some
years (real GDP growth in 2000, employment rate in 1990, or a common border in 2000), or
for a certain skill group (openness to immigration and language related regressors only for
high-skilled migration).
These results are then taken to predict migrant stocks for every country pair in each year.
Predictions are restricted to the domain [0,1]. Since I have estimated the stock of migrants
with high or low skills using both data from 1990 and 2000, I predict two different values
migrant stocks for each country pair and skill-group based on these two estimates. These two
predictions per skill group are then condensed into a single values by linear interpolation for
years 1990 to 2000. These country pair-year specific values are then transformed into indices
in the same way as described previously for the Index of Potential Labor Mobility.
Some descriptives for the alternatively calculated Index of Labor Mobility are shown in
Figure 5. Two features of the index catch the eye: First, values for low-skilled mobility are
always higher than for high-skilled individuals. This result is caused by the construction of
the index since I have to normalize the number of migrants by total population rather that
population with the same educational attainment due to data restrictions. However, the differ-
ences in educational participation are captured by country fixed-effects in the regressions unless
there are huge changes over time and/or countries significantly deviate from the general path
of educational expansion.
Second, English-speaking countries continue to show high levels of mobility and southern-
European ones and Japan the lowest. However, differences are much smaller than previously,
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Figure 5: Median, 75% range, and 95% range for Alternative Index of Labor Mobility, by source
country 1986 - 2006 and for individuals with above and below college education; Source: Own
calculations based on own index
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in particular for the mobility of low-skilled individuals. Third, the low-skilled are considerably
more mobile than the high-skilled in some countries such as Poland.
Table 10: Determinants of Migration Flows
Dependant Variable: Share of Migrants in Population
total migration low-skilled migration high-skilled migration
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
hourly wages (dest.) -0.005 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
real GDP growth (dest.) -0.007 -0.012*** -0.007 -0.008** 0.000 -0.004***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
employment rate (dest.) 0.018* -0.000 0.012 -0.001 0.006*** 0.000
(0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
labor market flexibility (dest.) 0.010*** 0.004** 0.006** 0.002 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
openness to immigration (dest.) 0.000 0.004 -0.008 0.000 0.008** 0.003**
(0.022) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
share of foreign born (dest.) 0.013 -0.003 0.014 0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
share of english speakers (dest.) -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
common language 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
common legal system 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
common border 0.007 0.005** 0.006 0.003** 0.001 0.001*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
inverse geograph. distance 0.111 -0.011 0.106 0.001 0.005 -0.013**
(0.076) (0.017) (0.065) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006)
share of population age 0-14 (origin) -0.064 -0.008 -0.056 -0.001 -0.009 -0.007
(0.055) (0.020) (0.048) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007)
family values (origin) -0.019 0.010* -0.017* 0.004 -0.002 0.006***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
non-native workers (origin) -0.010* -0.005 -0.008* -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
share of english speakers (origin) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
hourly wages (origin) -0.006 -0.007** -0.006 -0.005** -0.001 -0.002***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
real GDP growth (origin) 0.019 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.018) (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
unemployment rate (origin) -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.008 -0.000 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
constant 0.026 0.005 0.034 0.003 -0.008 0.003
(0.051) (0.017) (0.045) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
R2adj. 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.20
F-stat 2.15 4.45 1.81 3.68 2.70 4.74
Obs. 324 576 324 576 324 576
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **,
*** , resp. Compare Table 7 for further information on regressors.
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